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8States’ Evolving Role in the Supplemental Nutritional
Assistance Program
David A. Super
introduction
States have always been crucial to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP, formerly food stamps).1 Even though the federal government has paid
virtually all the program’s beneﬁt costs, state administration has always been indis-
pensable for several reasons. State and local governments pay their staff considerably
less than the federal government, making state administration less expensive.2 States
already administer other important antipoverty programs, notably family cash assist-
ance and Medicaid, allowing them to coordinate the programs and minimize
repetitive activities. And states have somewhat lower, and less polarizing, political
footprints than does the federal government, moderating criticism of the program. In
addition, giving states a stake in SNAP’s administration often has co-opted them to
support, or at least avoid attacking, the program.
From the perspective of states, administering SNAP has been an attractive deal.
Even though federal merit systems’ requirements prevent states from using SNAP
administrative positions for patronage, getting a large number of state workers at only
half the net cost is an attractive proposition. No doubt signiﬁcant numbers of
households mistakenly believe that the beneﬁts they receive come from the state’s
coffers when they receive them through state ofﬁces. And because the Food and
Nutrition Act makes no provision for anyone other than states to administer SNAP, a
state’s refusal to do so would mean turning away hundreds of millions or billions of
dollars of federal funds and straining local charities far past the breaking point.
States’ entrenched administrative role in SNAP has given them enormous inﬂu-
ence over how the program operates. Some of this power comes directly from their
1 Throughout this chapter, I will refer to SNAP and the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 when
speaking about all periods, even those when beneﬁts were called food stamps and were issued
under the Food Stamp Acts of 1964 or 1977.
2 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2567 (2005).
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role as administrators. The oft-repeated claim that SNAP is a program controlled
entirely by federal law has never been true. Over time, states’ control over program
operations has shifted somewhat from covert means to overt state options, but a
major state inﬂuence has remained. Anyone who follows the program nationally can
tell you in which states they would, or would not, prefer to live if they needed SNAP.
States also have exerted considerable inﬂuence over the program on the federal
level. Much of the program’s durability has come from its ability to transcend
partisan politics with a culture of objective policy analysis. This culture derives in
part from the peculiar nature of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
House and Senate Agriculture Committees, which are deeply conservative but also
dependent on the broader Congress to continue programs that transfer resources
from taxpayers and consumers to agribusiness. Analytically defensible SNAP policy
burnishes the image of the USDA and the committees as responsible stewards.
Carrying out this mission have been a relatively pragmatic series of chairs and
ranking members of the nutrition subcommittees and a career staff at the Food
and Nutrition Service (FNS) that is deeply committed to professionalism. State
human services agencies provided an obvious talent pool of public administrators
knowledgeable about SNAP. These ofﬁcials brought their appreciation of front-line
administrative challenges, and their contacts with people still in state agencies,
when they joined the federal service.
State human services agencies also have been a major source of the bureaucratic
expertise on which federal policy makers have relied. Because of their ofﬁcial role
implementing the program, federal ofﬁcials and congressional staff routinely hold
meetings with states’ representatives from which other stakeholders are excluded.
The policy decisions emanating from such meetings are all but impossible to
dislodge. When antihunger advocates criticize conservative proposals, or right-wing
groups attack liberal ones, state ofﬁcials often hold the de facto deciding voice,
adjudicating the claims for federal political ofﬁcials less steeped in policy details.
Savvy advocates learn to approach state agency representatives ﬁrst with any pro-
posals for federal policy change: if the states uniformly hate it, the proposal is
probably dead, and if the states have concerns the advocates need to build a
preemptive response into their initial pitches to federal administrators or congres-
sional staff. State agencies have sufﬁcient means of making federal administrators’
lives difﬁcult that FNS will often bow to states even on issues where it disagrees. And
state human services ofﬁcials’ presumed expertise allows them unusual political
access across the partisan divide even in times of increasing polarization: even if a
senator is thoroughly estranged from her or his opposite-party governor, the state’s
SNAP director – who, of course, works for that governor – can readily get through.
Knowing that states have broad inﬂuence over SNAP does not tell us how they
will exercise that inﬂuence. The values states seek to maximize in their inﬂuence on
SNAP have shifted considerably over time in response both to general political,
social, and economic currents and to changes in the program itself. Only rarely have
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they functioned as true laboratories of democracy with respect to SNAP, pursuing
varying courses toward a common end.
States’ SNAP agendas reﬂect the shifting inﬂuence and priorities among four
main groups.3 First, employers have sought a disciplined labor force. If SNAP is too
generous, workers may decline onerous low-wage jobs. If it is too miserly during
periods when employment is unavailable, the workers might move away and shrink
the available labor pool. These employer interests were particularly important,
especially in agricultural areas, during the program’s early years. As agriculture
automated and the national economy developed away from mass employment of
low-skilled workers, these concerns faded away from SNAP policy discourse. They
appear to be making a strong comeback in recent years, although the new emphasis
on workforce discipline represents something quite different.
Second, a wide range of humanitarians support SNAP as a means of meeting one
of the most basic of human needs. Some of these are simply compassionate voters
with no particular connection to hungry people. Others may be involved in religious
or other charity work and recognize that their efforts cannot scratch the surface in
meeting peoples’ needs without the nutritional foundation that SNAP provides.
Organizations of low-income people played important roles in some states despite
considerable barriers to their exercising political power.4 State legislators from
districts with large numbers of low-income people can be important voices for
strengthening SNAP. Particularly in rural areas, these often include Republicans.
Labor unions representing low-skilled workers have supported SNAP as a means of
reducing employers’ leverage, although labor interest waned rapidly after Congress
excluded most strikers from SNAP in the late 1970s. Often humanitarians are found
inside state human services agencies. Public employee unions have strongly sup-
ported SNAP. On the managerial level, SNAP directors often are among the most
liberal senior executives inside state human services agencies: people with undeni-
able skills but too much empathy for low-income people to be placed in charge of
programs dispensing state-funded beneﬁts such as Medicaid.
A third, more diffuse, group that periodically inﬂuences state SNAP policy
consists of efﬁciency-oriented economic elites. Businesses and afﬂuent individuals
seek lower state taxes, causing them to favor policies that maximize federal funding:
a less-generous SNAP would increase pressure for state-funded programs to ﬁll the
gaps. Many businesses see low-income people more as a market than as a potential
workforce. The more SNAP covers households’ food needs, the more cash they have
to pay their rent and utility bills and to buy other items. To the extent that these
elites see low-income people as workers, they may regard SNAP beneﬁts as lowering
wage demands much as employers welcome the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
3 See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure
of Anti-Poverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 593–600 (2008).
4 David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 Yale L. J. 2806 (2014).
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as reducing workers’ reservation wage. SNAP’s ﬁnancing makes these elites natural
supporters of the program – as long as their frame of reference is state speciﬁc.
A fourth group whose inﬂuence on state SNAP policies has grown dramatically
over time has been ideologues seeking new battlegrounds. For them, state SNAP
policy is more expressive than practical. Often, they seek to extend federal battles,
especially during periods when federal policy is gridlocked. Initially, the most
signiﬁcant of these groups were on the left. More recently, a vast increase in right-
wing funding, much of it coordinated by the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC), has led to a proliferation of state-facing organizations deeply
hostile to SNAP.
This chapter charts the history of states’ roles in SNAP as administrators, policy
makers, and policy advocates on the federal level. It ﬁnds that shifts in the strengths
and priorities of some of these groups, and in the emphasis each of them places on
SNAP, have produced dramatic changes in state policies.
states as disciplinarians of the poor
During the modern SNAP’s earliest years,5 the dominant policy model cast the states
as disciplinarians of low-income people. Prior to one person, one vote, rural interests
had outsized inﬂuence in state legislatures and were determined to prevent anything
from diminishing farm and domestic workers’ willingness to accept low wages.
These attitudes contributed to the consistent parsimony of states’ grant levels and
eligibility rules in Aid to Dependent Children and later Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). The depth of this concern was evident in many
states’ decisions to set SNAP eligibility and beneﬁt levels lower than permitted under
federal law even though it would have cost the states nothing to provide beneﬁts up
to the federally deﬁned level.
Aware of rural communities’ antipathy for antipoverty programs, when Congress
and President Nixon sought to make SNAP a national program in the early 1970s6
they required that states participate statewide or not at all. By then, urban areas had
developed sufﬁcient political power, and areas already operating SNAP had seen
enough of its beneﬁts, that giving up the program to accommodate recalcitrant rural
areas was unlikely. Still, several states had tense battles over statewide implementa-
tion of SNAP, and a few saw litigation.7 A compromise in some states was to give
counties primary administrative responsibility, with broad state oversight. Counties
5 An earlier version of the Food Stamp Program existed during the Great Depression. It was
sufﬁciently remote (temporally and politically) from the modern program, which began with
pilot projects in 1963 and federal legislation in 1964 that lessons from it are not readily
transferrable.
6 Pub. L. No. 93–86, 87 Stat 221 (1973).
7 Madden v. Oklahoma, 523 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1975); Commw. Dep’t of Public Welfare
v. Adams County, 392 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1978).
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also won the right to establish SNAP workfare programs even over their state’s
objections.
The modern SNAP was established in the midst of the civil rights revolution, at a
time when states’ rights were widely seen as a vehicle for perpetuating segregation
and oppression. Accordingly, it had relatively strong civil rights protections earlier
than other federal-state beneﬁt programs. Distrusting exercises in discretion that
state and local human services agencies had manipulated to disadvantage people of
color, FNS began the development of highly speciﬁc substantive and procedural
rules, initially contained in an FNS manual. Congress added far more detail to the
federal statute in 1977,8 and FNS took that opportunity to promulgate a detailed set
of federal regulations after holding numerous hearings around the country to solicit
information on problems in the program’s current operations.9
Having standards is one thing, of course, but enforcing them is another. Federal
statutes appeared to give FNS substantial leverage on noncompliant state and local
agencies. In practice, however, each of the available tools was problematic. The
Secretary of Agriculture could ask the Attorney General to sue a state for injunctive
relief;10 in practice, this has never happened as the rupture in federal-state relations
that such a suit would bring has struck FNS as too drastic. FNS has the authority to
withhold federal administrative funding from a noncompliant state.11 FNS, however,
has consistently believed states are spending too little on administering SNAP;
reducing administrative resources further, especially for acts of nonfeasance, was
unappealing. Moreover, creating a large hole in the state’s human services budget
could get the SNAP director ﬁred – whether she or he was responsible for the
problem – potentially putting the state’s program in inexperienced hands at a time of
crisis. Accordingly, FNS established an elaborate system of warnings designed to get
the attention of ofﬁcials senior enough to command the necessary resources to
address the problem without destabilizing SNAP in the state. Even when FNS did
withhold funds, it typically restored them once the state came into compliance.
Because this bluff becomes less effective the more often it is run, FNS was hesitant
to make formal ﬁndings of state noncompliance.
Simultaneously, however, private enforcement was becoming a realistic possibil-
ity. The Supreme Court’s embrace of relatively liberal standards for private enforce-
ability of programmatic statutes, together with the survival and growth of federally
funded civil legal services, gave low-income households the chance to hold state and
local agencies accountable for discriminatory, belligerent, or incompetent adminis-
tration of SNAP. Coordinating much of this effort was the Food Research and
Action Center (FRAC), a nonproﬁt group led by creative and energetic litigators
8 Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–464 (1977).
9 7 C.F.R. Parts 271–290 (2018).
10 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) (2016); 7 C.F.R. § 276.5 (2018).
11 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) (2016); 7 C.F.R. § 276.4 (2018).
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who saw access to food assistance as the next front in the civil rights movement.12
Lawsuits FRAC brought or helped to coordinate challenged access to the program,13
delays in state application processing,14 the lack of prompt, effective fair hearings,15
and the failure to pay retroactive beneﬁts to households unlawfully denied
assistance.16
The decline in power and commitment by employer groups seeking a dependent
low-skill workforce, the promulgation of detailed regulations facilitating comparison
of state and local ofﬁces’ administration of the program, and the threat of recipient
litigation and occasional federal sanctions pushed the disciplinarian model of state
administration to the margins. A few traces of it remain. A handful of counties
scattered around the country continued to operate workfare programs. Underfund-
ing still led to periodic administrative problems, and the considerable discretion
SNAP ofﬁces had in how much paperwork to demand of applicants likely led to
signiﬁcantly disparate experiences for households in different parts of the country.
Disciplinarian themes appeared in federal policy discourse when most strikers
were ejected from the program in the late 1970s17 and when Senator Jesse Helms
won adoption of an employment and training (E&T) program for SNAP recipients
in 1985.18 The American Enterprise Institute’s Charles Murray had tried to revive
idea of disciplining the poor a year earlier when he proposed abolishing all anti-
poverty programs operating above the county level, with the idea that local ofﬁcials
would have a better sense of the availability of work for claimants.19 His work
triggered a hail of criticism over his misuse of crucial data;20 although he became
an instant icon on the ideological right, his ideas had little immediate impact on
policy.
It was a sign that the times had changed, however, when state SNAP adminis-
trators objected to the required high participation rates and low funding that E&T
initially featured. In response to these complaints and an FNS study showing that
E&T had no positive effects on employment or wages,21 Congress moderated those
participation rate requirements in the early 1990s. With their own experience of
12 The author served as FRAC’s legal director, albeit many years after the heyday of its
litigation role.
13 E.g., Tyson v. Maher, 523 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1975).
14 E.g., Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
15 E.g., Lambus v. Walsh, 448 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
16 E.g., Bermudez v. USDA, 490 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084 (3d
Cir. 1973).
17 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (2016).
18 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(4) (2016).
19 Charles Murray, Losing Ground American Social Policy 1950–1980 227–33 (1984).
20 See, e.g., Robert Greenstein, Losing Faith in “Losing Ground,” New Republic, Mar. 25, 1985,
at 12.
21 Michael J. Puma et al., Food & Nutrition Serv., Evaluation of the Food Stamp
Employment and Training Program: Final Report (June 1990).
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E&T’s uselessness mirroring research ﬁndings, few states claimed much of the open-
ended federal matching funds available to expand their E&T programs.
states as maximizers of federal funding
From the early 1960s to the 1980s, the value of low-income families’ combined
AFDC and SNAP beneﬁts remained roughly constant after adjusting for inﬂation.
This occurred because the creation and expansion of SNAP roughly offset the
stagnation of AFDC eligibility and beneﬁt levels. SNAP eligibility and beneﬁt levels
were tied, directly or indirectly, to the federal poverty level, which rose with
inﬂation. Few states automatically adjusted their AFDC eligibility or grant levels
for inﬂation, and many states would freeze or cut grant levels during the ﬁscal crises
that accompanied recessions.
One effect of this shift in the composition of a roughly constant beneﬁt package
was a transfer of resources from the federal government, which paid all SNAP
beneﬁt costs, to states, which paid for 20–30 percent of AFDC beneﬁts. This also
led many state governments to start seeing SNAP as an important infusion of federal
dollars into their local economies. A decade or so before Medicaid “creative
ﬁnancing” schemes began siphoning billions of addition dollars into state coffers,22
a more low-key change began to emerge in state attitudes toward SNAP.
The evolving resource-maximizing view of SNAP manifested itself in a range of
ways, some crudely self-interested. Many states cut, or failed to increase, AFDC
beneﬁts23 in reliance on SNAP to offset 30–45 percent of the loss to households.24
Other states went further and sought waivers from federal law to convert SNAP
beneﬁts into cash to make them full substitutes for partially state-funded cash
assistance. After the Clinton administration showed no willingness to deny such
waivers, a coalition of alarmed liberal and agriculture-oriented members of Congress
enacted ﬁrst an appropriations rider prohibiting new cash-out waivers and then
made the restriction permanent with a provision in the 1996 welfare law.25
Most states, however, took a broader view of maximizing federal funds, seeking to
increase SNAP beneﬁts for their residents rather than seeking to directly ﬁll state
coffers. Several redesignated portions of cash assistance grants in ways that could
22 David A. Super, Public Welfare Law 783–84 (Foundation Press 2016).
23 See, e.g., Quattlebaum v. Barry, 671 A.2d 881 (D.C. 1995) (ﬁnding this explicit reliance did not
violate 7 U.S.C. § 2017(b), which prohibits considering SNAP beneﬁts in determining eligibil-
ity for other public program).
24 SNAP beneﬁts generally rise 30 cents for each dollar reduction in net income. 7 U.S.C. § 2017
(a) (2016). Net income for households with high shelter costs, however, is calculated with a
deduction that grows as income declines, leaving many households with an effective marginal
beneﬁt reduction rate of 45 percent for unearned income such as AFDC beneﬁts. See id. § 2014
(d)(6).
25 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(B)(iv)(I) and (II) (2016).
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prevent them from being counted as income in SNAP, thus increasing SNAP
beneﬁts.26 Some sued USDA for permission to apply more lenient income-counting
rules in determining SNAP beneﬁts.27 A dozen states quietly refused to follow FNS’s
policy of counting utility allowances from public housing authorities as income to
resident households, while recipients and one state litigated the matter, prevailing
after more than a decade.28 With state human services agencies’ encouragement,
many members of Congress come to regard SNAP like other grants in aid, advocat-
ing policies that would send more money to their home states.29
Remarkably in light of subsequent events, states overwhelmingly opposed pro-
posals by President Reagan and Senator Helms to convert SNAP into a block grant
to the states. Although particular state ofﬁcials would have gained more control over
federal beneﬁt dollars, they recognized that block grant funding would deteriorate
over time to leave low-income households with less ability to purchase food absent
increased state funding. Even in the more polarized environment of the mid-1990s,
most governors and almost all state administrators expressed little or no support for
proposals to block-grant SNAP even as they were eagerly lobbying to replace AFDC.
The most important manifestation of the beneﬁt-maximizing mindset, however,
appeared in states’ exercise of discretion in program administration. More and more
state human services agencies began to signal their front-line eligibility workers to be
more lenient in granting SNAP beneﬁts than they were for state-funded beneﬁts.
Deep-seated hostilities toward low-income people nurtured by some eligibility
workers limited these signals’ effectiveness, but overall SNAP became signiﬁcantly
more accessible, increasing participation.
Under other circumstances this shift might have gone unnoticed, but the late
1970s saw two other forces driving up SNAP participation: the recession of 1979–80
and the Food Stamp Act of 1977, which opened the program to many more low-
wage workers and made participation more attractive by eliminating the
26 See, e.g.,Maryland Dep’t of Human Services v. USDA, 976 F.2d 1462 (4th Cir. 1992) (discredit-
ing one state’s purported energy assistance program); Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House
of Representatives, Comm. on Ways & Means, 1994 Green Book 367 n. 5 (describing
nine states’ designation of parts of AFDC grants as energy assistance); Commw. of Mass.
v. Lyng, 893 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1990) (refusing to exclude back-to-school clothing allowances
from SNAP income).
27 See, e.g., id.; Dep’t of Health & Welfare, State of Idaho v. Block, 784 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986)
(ﬁnding energy assistance recipients entitled to standard utility allowance in computing SNAP
shelter deduction); State of New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1987) (declining to exclude
from SNAP income allowances given to homeless people to allow them to obtain meals in
restaurants); South Dakota Dep’t of Social Serv. v. Madigan, 824 F. Supp. 1469 (D.S.D. 1993)
(ﬁnding that public housing utility allowances do not count as income in determining SNAP
beneﬁts).
28 See Estey v. Comm’r, Maine Dep’t of Human Serv., 21 F.3d 1198 (1st Cir. 1994) (ﬁnding utility
allowances excludable); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
29 For example, Senate Agriculture Committee Ranking Republican Richard Lugar inserted 7
U.S.C. § 2014(k)(2)(G) into the statute to exclude from SNAP income calculations township
relief payments of a type found in his home state of Indiana.
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requirement that households purchase (at a discount) their beneﬁts. With SNAP
operating under a funding cap, surging participation forced the Carter adminis-
tration to make an embarrassing request for emergency legislation to keep beneﬁts
ﬂowing.30 In response to harsh congressional questioning about the surge in partici-
pation, the administration inaugurated an auditing system known as quality
control (QC).
Although the Carter administration envisioned QC as one of many management
tools to identify states’ administrative deﬁciencies, when Ronald Reagan took over
the White House and Republicans won control of the Senate, it quickly became
much, much more. President Reagan and new Senate Agriculture Committee
Chair Jesse Helms established severe automatic ﬁscal penalties for any state whose
error rate exceeded 5 percent, as measured by QC’s methods of imputation from a
random sample. This level was dramatically lower than almost any state was
achieving. Once the new system became fully effective with federal ﬁscal year
1983, more than 45 states faced sanctions each year. The amounts of these sanctions
were staggering, far beyond most states’ ability to absorb without action from their
legislatures and likely deep cuts to their stafﬁng levels. This presented the same
dilemma that FNS had always faced concerning ﬁscal sanctions against states: if the
state needed more, not less administrative resources, slashing its human services
budget would only make matters worse. Here, however, FNS had far less room to
maneuver: it was having to deal with the great majority of states all at once, the
amounts at issue were generally much greater than FNS had even threatened on its
own, no simple path to state compliance was evident, the statute gave the agency
little discretion, and it was under immense pressure from Senator Helms, the
Reagan White House, and its own political leadership (including former Helms
staffer John Bode as Assistant Secretary) to take a hard line.
The Reagan administration’s political leadership placed enormous pressure on
FNS to reduce error rates, which in turn led many FNS regional ofﬁces to place
enormous pressure on human services administrators. Previously cordial quarterly
meetings between FNS Regional Administrators and state human services commis-
sioners became tense standoffs over error rates. Accustomed to federal demands to
implement this or that required SNAP policy, states were frustrated that FNS refused
to specify what actions states could take to satisfy it. FNS insisted that only radically
lower error rates would sufﬁce. As SNAP directors and human services commission-
ers made their governors and legislatures aware of these potential sanctions, states’
attitudes toward SNAP began to change. Several liberal SNAP directors and welfare
commissioners were ﬁred over QC error rates despite the fact that the vast majority
of other states were in the same position. Some states concluded that SNAP expertise
was crucial to solving a SNAP problem and promoted career civil servants with
30 See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 633 (2004)
(describing drawbacks of funding caps).
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commitments to low-income people not very different from those of their predeces-
sors; others sought the sort of dispassionate accounting-oriented managers that had
for some time run their Medicaid programs.
States’ messages to front-line eligibility workers changed dramatically. Veriﬁca-
tion requirements multiplied, with those unable to produce the demanded docu-
ments summarily denied SNAP. These policies made accessing SNAP exceedingly
difﬁcult for people who have difﬁculty preserving important documents because of
frequent moves, family breakups, or criminal victimization. The move to maximum
veriﬁcation was particularly ill-timed as the recession of 1981–82, deinstitutionaliza-
tion, and the evisceration of state general assistance programs was creating a surge in
homelessness.
Because the QC error rates that determined ﬁscal sanctions depended exclusively
on improper awards of beneﬁts and overissuances – not improper denials or under-
issuances – many states began to send eligibility workers’ ill-disguised messages that,
when in doubt, they should deny SNAP beneﬁts. Indeed, because in a large portion
of error cases the agency acted correctly given what it knew at the time, many
eligibility workers came to view all applicants and recipients as potential sources of
errors. Some states found creative means of driving home the single-mindedness of
their demand for avoiding errors, frequently imposing collective punishment on
local ofﬁces with high error rates even though QC samples were insufﬁcient to
generate reliable county-level estimates. One state required eligibility workers who
had had cases containing QC errors to post pictures of bombs in their cubicles so
that their colleagues could see who was responsible for the ofﬁce’s error rate.31
At the same time, Congress required states to compel almost all SNAP households
to submit monthly reports on their circumstances whether anything had changed.
The window for submitting these reports was extremely narrow: reports submitted
too early were deemed incomplete and those submitted more than a few days after
the end of the prior month were deemed late, in either case resulting in a suspension
of beneﬁts. If an eligibility worker was behind on paperwork or on vacation, if the
SNAP ofﬁce’s mail sorting and distribution malfunctioned, or if its automated
system failed, households that had complied perfectly were cut off,32 without a
pretermination hearing.33 QC gave local SNAP managers an unappealing choice
when they lacked the staff to process monthly reports timely: suspending the beneﬁts
of households that reported timely would be unlawful, but continuing beneﬁts
when some of their reports might contain changes that should affect their beneﬁt
level invited QC errors that could cost the manager her or his job.
31 A scarlet “QC” might have been more ﬁtting.
32 Robert Greenstein & Marion E. Nichols, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities,
Monthly Reporting in the Food Stamp Program (Sept. 1988).
33 7 C.F.R. § 273.21(h) (2018).
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Unsurprisingly, procedural terminations of eligible households proliferated.34
States were required to report their rates of improper denials, but FNS generally
did not audit those claims. The Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) and
other outside groups found serious underreporting of improper denials.35 FNS’s
response was tepid at best compared with the relentless campaign to lower error
rates. Eventually, many antihunger advocates at both the federal and state levels
concluded that lightening QC’s heavy hand on state administration was the most
important change that could be made in SNAP, ahead of liberalizations in eligibility
and beneﬁt computation rules.
QC dominated federal-state relations concerning SNAP for almost two decades. It
sharply changed the nature of states’ maximizing behavior from concern about the
budgets of low-income households to fretting about their own. It also marginalized
the threat of litigation by low-income households to enforce provisions of the federal
statute and regulations: even if such litigation were to go badly, the sanctions a court
might plausibly impose would pale compared to QC penalties.36
By the late 1980s, QC politics had begun to change at the federal level. More and
more states had concluded that existing targets were essentially unmeetable, focus-
ing their attention on federal legislation. Covington & Burling, which represented
many states in litigating QC penalties, strongly urged its clients to pursue a legisla-
tive solution and represented them in that process. Several former governors and
state legislators who had confronted QC sanctions had entered Congress. The two
most powerful organizations of state governments – the National Governors Associ-
ation and the National Conference of State Legislatures – heard concern from such
a broad cross-section of states that they moved SNAP QC to the top of their
legislative priorities.
On the other side, Senator Helms almost completely disengaged from SNAP
when he lost the chair of the Agriculture Committee after Democrats won the
Senate in 1986; indeed, he elected to displace Richard Lugar as the ranking member
on the Foreign Relations Committee, which made it awkward for him to interfere in
Senator Lugar’s leadership on the Agriculture Committee. Assistant Secretary Bode
and other USDA ofﬁcials appeared to have wearied over ﬁghting with states about
QC. QC error rates had declined sharply, weakening the political imperatives that
had led Congress to impose automatic sanctions. By this time, the only major active
participant in SNAP policy making who did not seek to dial back QC sanctions was
the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) poetically named budget
34 See, e.g., Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration
of New York City’s Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. Law & Soc. Change 231 (1989–
90)
35 See, e.g., GAO, Food Stamp Program: Evaluation of Improper Denial or Termination
Error Rates (1987). At the time, GAO was known as the General Accounting Ofﬁce.
36 David A. Super, Are Rights Efﬁcient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual
Rights, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2005).
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examiner for SNAP, Les Cash. Although personally sympathetic to SNAP’s goals,
Cash understood OMB’s institutional role as maintaining relentless pressure for
better program administration. Many at OMB then also saw it as an institutional
counterweight to cabinet departments and Congress, both of which are susceptible
to capture by state governmental interests.
After protracted negotiations among states, Bode, and antihunger advocates, with
congressional staff of both parties acting as mediators and Cash unseen but closely
constraining what Bode could offer, a substantial revision of SNAP QC was added to
the Hunger Prevention Act of 198837 that sought to cut in half the number of states
sanctioned each year. It also added underissuances to recipients – but not the far
more important improper denials – to error rate calculations. For budgetary reasons,
however, it did not address the huge backlog of sanctions states had accrued up to
that point.
After President George H. W. Bush lost the 1992 election, and most of his political
appointees with responsibility for SNAP left for private-sector jobs, Andrew Hornsby,
the former Alabama welfare commissioner, became acting FNS Administrator.
Hornsby concluded that the risk of accusations of ﬁscal irresponsibility, and the
watchful eye of OMB, would deter any regular presidential appointee from elimin-
ating the huge backlog of state QC sanctions. Accordingly, he offered to excuse
85 percent of states’ outstanding sanction balances in exchange for promises to
“reinvest” the remaining 15 percent in efforts to improve state administration. States
took him up on his offer en masse. A series of legislative and further executive
actions eliminated or sharply reduced sanction liabilities for subsequent years.
Antihunger legislation in 199338 further modiﬁed SNAP QC, sharply reducing
penalty amounts by scaling them to the severity of violations but somewhat increas-
ing the number of states sanctioned.
Although QC was no longer sanctioning 45 states a year, it was still sanctioning
about half of them each year; many more were within or near the QC sample’s
margin of error. Only about 10 states each year could be conﬁdent that they would
not face sanctions, with the rest continuing to obsess about their error rates. At the
opening sessions of the American Association of SNAP Directors, where state
delegations introduce themselves and talk brieﬂy about the issues dominating their
attention, almost every state discussed its error rate and typically nothing else.
While most antipoverty advocates were distracted by congressional battles over the
1996 welfare law, states and FNS career staff quietly began transforming SNAP in
response to QC pressures. Given the pressure it was applying to state administrators,
FNS felt uncomfortable refusing states’ proposals to change SNAP rules in ways that
might allow them to reduce errors. FNS therefore began granting waivers from some
access-protecting regulations and abandoned enforcement of others. This allowed
37 Pub. L. No. 100–435 (1988).
38 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–624 (1993).
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states more leeway to deny or terminate eligible households for minor technical
mistakes. It also let states require households to reapply every three months to
continue receiving beneﬁts. Neither FNS nor the states explained how this squared
with regulations requiring states to grant households the longest possible certiﬁca-
tion period up to one year and prohibiting certiﬁcation periods less than six months
absent extraordinary circumstances.39
The impact of these practices was concealed initially by caseload declines driven
by an improving economy, the stigmatizing effect of debates over what became the
1996 welfare law, and the massive SNAP cuts that law contained. By 1998, however,
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities noticed that caseload declines were
about twice what could be explained by the improving economy and the estimated
impact of the welfare law.40 Further, as more data became available it emerged that
caseload declines were much steeper in two heavily overlapping groups of states:
those achieving very large reductions in their QC error rates and those dramatically
increasing their reliance on three-month certiﬁcation periods. Flying in the face of
the “welfare-to-work” rhetoric dominating human services debates in that period,
these caseload reductions fell heaviest on working families with children. This
reﬂected states’ belief that these households had the greatest risk of causing QC
errors because of the potential for their circumstances to change without the state
agency learning and acting in time to adjust the household’s beneﬁts. In a clear face-
off between ideological commitments to promoting work and states’ desires to
maximize protection against QC sanctions, the latter won overwhelmingly, with
FNS’s acquiescence.
Antihunger advocates saw this trend as both a serious harm in its own right and a
grave threat to SNAP’s stability and survival. AFDC had been dissolved in large part
because it became associated with nonwork. Just as nobody cared that deliberate
Reagan administration policies were the reason AFDC lacked substantial numbers
of working recipients, nobody likely would care that SNAP’s dwindling working
poor participation was a byproduct of overzealous error-reduction efforts.
Because the existing QC system did indeed make households with complex or
changeable circumstances greater error risks, states could be expected to impose
burdensome requirements on working poor households – either to discourage their
participation outright41 or at least to minimize the risk of errors. Unless QC’s error
measurement could be adjusted to reﬂect the degree of difﬁculty of states’ caseloads
or states’ QC anxieties could be largely laid to rest, burdensome requirements were
likely to become standard. Advocates successfully lobbied OMB and the White
House to direct FNS to implement a series of QC and programmatic changes to
39 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f )(4)-(5) (1998).
40 The author was general counsel at CBPP during this period.
41 See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for
Rationing Public Beneﬁts, 113 Yale L. J. 815 (2004).
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remove the bullseye from the backs of working households. With President Clinton
seeking to pivot from his impeachment to establishing a legacy, he embraced the
opportunity to announce a package of initiatives to help working poor households
receive food assistance. The Clinton Food Stamp Initiative of July 14, 1999, allowed
states to liberalize the rules for households to own motor vehicles while receiving
SNAP, reduced reporting obligations for working poor households (which had the
effect of preventing many routine changes in circumstances from causing inadvert-
ent errors), and moderated the QC system. The initiative and follow-on action that
September established a formula for waiving QC sanctions that likely resulted from
serving larger numbers of working families. States’ error rates were recomputed for
three subpopulations – working households with children, households with immi-
grant members,42 and all others – with states’ sanctions adjusted downward to reﬂect
that share of the states’ overall error rates resulting from disproportionate numbers of
error-prone households. In addition, the tolerance for small errors was updated for
inﬂation so that a recipient having a single extra work shift in a month would not be
enough to cause an error.
The transformation in state attitudes was immediate and dramatic. The only states
left with substantial QC sanctions were ones that undeniably did have serious
problems with their programs’ administration. These states had beneﬁted from the
united front of states sanctioned or at risk of sanctions, but now they had to face the
realities of their own problems. Responding to the new priorities that the Clinton
Initiative established, FNS offered these states plans under which part of their
sanctions could be “reinvested” in improvements to program administration and
part could be held “at risk,” to be paid if the state’s error rate remains high but
waived if the state achieves signiﬁcant progress. The “at risk” device sought to give
human services administrators leverage with their state budget ofﬁcers, governors,
and legislatures to secure funding for more adequate stafﬁng of SNAP eligibility
determination. It often proved successful, allowing further reduction in error rates
and thinning the ranks of states with seriously high error rates.
So rapid and complete was the change in state attitudes that states largely yawned
in spring 2000 when FNS released the largest package of proposed SNAP regulatory
changes in more than two decades. Along with changes required by the 1996 welfare
law and those needed to codify the Clinton Food Stamp Initiative, this package
included sweeping rollbacks of long-standing program access provisions. FNS had
developed this package with state administrators in the mid-1990s as the culmination
of the effort to reduce states’ workloads and tighten access for potentially error-prone
cases. It had languished in USDA’s glacial clearance process and eventually been
combined with the proposed rules to implement the 1996 welfare law.
42 Although their modest numbers made them relatively small drivers in most states’ error rates,
the complexity of post-1996 eligibility rules for households containing immigrant members
resulted in unusually large error rates for these households as well.
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A handful of states submitted tepidly supportive comments and a few more raised
minor technical quibbles. By contrast, antihunger advocates reacted with outrage
that the Clinton administration was considering these changes while SNAP enroll-
ment was already plummeting. Hundreds of comments, some exceeding one hun-
dred pages, attacked the proposed regulations. Antihunger groups pressed Secretary
of Agriculture Dan Glickman and senior OMB and Domestic Policy Council
ofﬁcials to intervene. Although former governor Clinton’s White House always
had an open door to representatives of state governments, no pressure in support
of the proposed rules emerged. In the end, Les Cash’s successor guided a thorough
rewrite of the proposed rules to eliminate virtually all access-restricting provisions.
Instead, the ﬁnal rules further relaxed accounting pressures on working poor house-
holds and, correspondingly, potential QC errors for states.43 State administrators’
enthusiasm over these provisions swamped any disappointment over the rejection of
the proposals they had negotiated with FNS at the height of the QC crisis.
Both antihunger advocates and state administrators wondered what George
W. Bush’s election would mean for the new federal-state détente in SNAP. They
were relieved when he brought his human services commissioner from Texas, Eric
Bost, to Washington to become USDA’s undersecretary for food assistance pro-
grams. Although Texas had achieved very low error rates by driving working poor
families off SNAP with three-month certiﬁcation periods, Bost had previously served
in other states and empathized with administrators facing QC sanctions. Using his
knowledge of the program, his direct access to the president, and his considerable
political skills, Bost persuaded the Bush administration to propose codiﬁcation and
expansion of some of the key Clinton program access initiatives and signed off on
statutory QC reforms that were roughly the equivalent of what the Clinton adminis-
tration had done administratively. Although improper denials and terminations
remained outside the payment error rate on which sanctions were based, the
legislation created a pool of bonus funds for states with outstanding performance
in avoiding incorrect negative actions as well as for those that achieved high rates of
timely application processing and participation among eligible households.44 When
this legislation passed with broad bipartisan support, states could feel conﬁdent that
a new consensus had emerged to balance concern with payment accuracy and
program access.45
43 A QC error is deﬁned as a substantial divergence between the beneﬁts that should have been
paid, if any, and the amount that were paid due to a violation of program rules by either the state
agency or the household. If the program rules require fewer reports from households, fewer
violations of reporting rules are possible.
44 7 U.S.C. § 2025(d) (2016).
45 David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the
Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1271 (2004).
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The end of the QC wars led to a rapid, widespread acceptance of state options to
improve access to low-wage workers.46 Within a few years, almost every state was
allowing working families to report on their circumstances only once every six
months. Three-month certiﬁcation periods largely vanished except for households
genuinely expected to leave the area almost immediately. All but a handful of states
stopped counting the value of motor vehicles as assets in determining SNAP
eligibility, using either “broad-based categorical eligibility”47 or another option that
Representative Jim Walsh (R-NY) quietly added through an appropriations bill in
2000. Many adopted options to provide transitional SNAP beneﬁts to people leaving
welfare for work.
Indeed, even in the midst of the QC conﬂict and the philosophical upheaval that
the 1996 welfare law occasioned, states continued to seek to maximize federal SNAP
funding in ways that would not adversely affect their error rates. Only a small
handful adopted various options the welfare law provided to expand disqualiﬁcations
of otherwise eligible low-income people.48 And after some initial skittishness, all but
one state requested that their high-unemployment areas be waived49 from the
welfare law’s three-month time limit on childless adults.50 Indeed, most states had
become such reliable SNAP maximizers that antihunger advocates relied on state
options to eliminate counterproductive rules that were politically entrenched
federally.
States’ fund-maximizing largely represents a convergence of the humanitarian
and elite efﬁciency-oriented perspectives on SNAP. The prospect of draconian QC
penalties fractured that alliance for a time, but the alliance quickly reemerged with
the end of overzealous QC enforcement. Groups that might have exploited that split
lacked sufﬁcient focus on SNAP: those advocating a disciplinary approach in prior
46 Program Design Branch, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Food Stamp Program
State Options Report at 1–8 (4th ed. Sept. 2004) https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
ﬁles/snap/4-State_Options.pdf.
47 The 1996 welfare law preserved a long-standing feature of SNAP law, “categorical eligibility,”
that eliminated the usual asset test for households in which all members received beneﬁts
under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, which previously had contained AFDC and now
housed the TANF block grant. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (2016). Under AFDC, beneﬁts generally
meant a monthly cash assistance check for which eligibility depended on meeting an even
more stringent asset test. TANF, however, allowed states to provide many other kinds of
beneﬁts without an asset test. Under “broad-based categorical eligibility,” a state can give all
members of a household access to an inexpensive service and treat the household as categoric-
ally eligible for SNAP as a result. Antihunger advocates had pointed out this opportunity to
states in 1998, and FNS acknowledged its validity in its 2000 regulations, but many states
delayed implementing until they were conﬁdent that USDA would continue to recognize this
option.
48 State Options Report, supra, at 18–21.
49 Ed Bolen & Stacy Dean, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Waivers Add Key State
Flexibility to SNAP’s Three-Month Time Limit (Feb. 6, 2018) www.cbpp.org/research/
food-assistance/waivers-add-key-state-ﬂexibility-to-snaps-three-month-time-limit.
50 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2016).
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decades had become deeply marginalized by the 1990s, and, although right-wing
ideological opponents of antipoverty programs were becoming active in states, their
primary focus was still on cash assistance funded under the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) block grant that replaced AFDC.
states as ideological battlegrounds
Responses to poverty combine practical and symbolic aspects. This has long been
true of AFDC, which has served for some as a symbol of American generosity and for
others as a monument to changing social norms. As open embraces of white
supremacy became socially unacceptable, attacks on “welfare” served as a popular
substitute. The result of symbolic political battles over AFDC was the program’s
decay and ultimate dissolution. The same uneasy partnership between practical and
symbolic qualities exists in private charity as well: the stampede of volunteers seeking
to help cook Thanksgiving dinner for the homeless is all about the symbolism of
giving; the charities’ struggles to ration grossly inadequate resources among myriad
desperate applicants are typically guided by practical considerations.
State SNAP policy historically has been driven almost entirely by practical
concerns, benign or otherwise. Those seeking to make symbolic or ideological
points have focused on cash assistance, federal policy makers, or both. Over the
past decade, however, that has changed dramatically. Progressive ideologues’ atten-
tion remains ﬁxed elsewhere, chieﬂy on enacting a single-payer health care system.
Conservative ideologues, however, have begun to engage enthusiastically with state
SNAP policy. This movement has provided a powerful counterpoint to the long-
standing priority of maximizing federal funds.
This shift has several sources. Partly it reﬂects the radicalization of the Republican
Party. Although many prominent Republicans – Richard Nixon, Bob Dole, Rudy
Boschwitz, Bill Emerson, Richard Lugar, Saxby Chambliss, and Thad Cochran,
among others – helped build and defend SNAP, today’s Republican Party has
forgotten or disparaged them. Even though a Republican president sent Congress
a package of SNAP eligibility and beneﬁt expansions as recently as 2002, support for
antipoverty programs appears no longer to lie within the acceptable range of
Republican thought.51
The shift from maximizing federal funds to maximizing ideological purity also
reﬂects similar changes in other areas of antipoverty policy. Several Republican
governors rejected welfare-to-work grants that bipartisan federal legislation created in
1997 despite the ﬁt with the goals those governors were espousing. Resistance to the
bipartisan No Child Left Behind Act similarly privileged states’ rights ideology over
receipt of federal education funds. And on a much grander scale, Republican states’
51 Indeed, had Senator Cochran not recently retired, the author would have omitted him from
this list to avoid embarrassing him politically.
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refusal to accept the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, and refusal to
establish state health insurance exchanges, sacriﬁced billions of dollars that would
have beneﬁted politically powerful hospitals and doctors.52 Voluntarily reducing the
ﬂow of federal funds by operating a miserly version of SNAP is far less costly.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant reason state SNAP policy has become so ideological
is the rapid growth of funding for right-wing state advocacy. A few states have long
had conservative policy groups, but these were relatively small and only occasionally
engaged seriously with antipoverty policy. Washington-based conservative advocacy
groups such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the
Cato Institute occasionally tried to inﬂuence state policy, but this often consisted
only of issuing national reports or responding to speciﬁc requests in states.
All that changed with rise of ALEC. ALEC is well known for feeding model bills
to conservative state legislators such as the “stand your ground” law that helped
acquit Trayvon Martin’s killer. ALEC meetings also provide a vehicle for connect-
ing conservative donors with state-oriented advocacy groups. In addition to ALEC,
which has steadily increased its opposition to antipoverty programs, state policy
makers increasingly hear from the Secretaries’ Innovation Group (SIG) and the
Foundation for Government Accountability (FGA). SIG is an organization of right-
wing former human services administrators; FGA broadly seeks to reduce eligibility
and beneﬁts in antipoverty programs. Although each remains hostile to programs
under the TANF block grant, so few people remain on cash assistance,53 and states’
policies are already so restrictive, that it has lost appeal even as a symbolic target.
Right-wing advocacy groups’ agendas typically lack unifying principles except
reducing eligibility for SNAP and portraying SNAP recipients negatively. These
groups are not, for example, pursuing the kind of “prowork” agenda that prior
conservatives claimed: FGA advocates disqualifying otherwise eligible people who
cannot ﬁnd jobs for enough hours, but it also pushes to disqualify low-wage workers
based on the value of the cars they drive to work. Even the Heritage Foundation’s
Robert Rector, by far the most important outside inﬂuence in shaping the 1996 wel-
fare law’s massive beneﬁt cuts, found parts of FGA’s agenda excessive.54
Many of their proposals seek to weaken public support for SNAP by implying
serious moral deﬁciencies in low-income people without any serious evidence.55
52 See David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and
Popular Constitutionalism, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 873 (2014).
53 Ife Floyd et al., Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, TANF Reaching Few Poor
Families (rev. Dec. 13, 2017), www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/tanf-reaching-
few-poor-families.
54 Robert Rector et al., Heritage Foundation, Five Steps Congress Can Take to
Encourage Work in the Food Stamps Program (Apr. 19, 2018), www.heritage.org/
hunger-and-food-programs/report/ﬁve-steps-congress-can-take-encourage-work-the-food-stamps-
program.
55 See David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104
Colum. L. Rev. 2032 (2004).
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They demand that applicants be drug tested despite the lack of evidence of dispro-
portionate substance abuse by SNAP recipients – and insufﬁcient treatment facilities
for most. Similarly, despite USDA studies showing low fraud in SNAP,56 these
groups demand aggressive, and loudly stigmatizing, antifraud campaigns. Ignoring
evidence that low-income shoppers obtain more nutrients per food dollar spent than
any other income group, FGA champions obesity-themed food purchasing restric-
tions. Similarly, FGA advocates ﬁnger-printing recipients even though several states’
experience with ﬁnger imaging was so thoroughly cost-ineffective that FNS no
longer allows federal matching funds for such contracts.57 Another stigmatizing
proposal without practical potential would require SNAP recipients to have photo-
graphic identiﬁcation cards: these serve no practical purpose as retailers cannot
require persons to present such cards because federal regulations allow households
to authorize representatives to buy food for them.58 Capitalizing on stigmatization of
overweight persons and ignoring research evidence that SNAP recipients obtain
more nutrients per food dollar spent, they advocate restrictions on what SNAP
beneﬁts may purchase, which would lead to many humiliating interactions at
checkout lines.
These groups’ top priority, however, has been enacting state laws prohibiting
human services agencies from seeking waivers from the three-month time limit that
the 1996 welfare law imposed on many childless adults between the ages of 18 and
50. Although this provision’s sponsors misleadingly characterized it as a “work
requirement,” it disqualiﬁes individuals without regard to how much effort she or
he has made to ﬁnd work or how willing she or he is to perform unpaid work in
exchange for continued SNAP eligibility. As noted previously, the statute allows
states to request waivers from this requirement for areas with “insufﬁcient jobs,” and
in the late 1990s all but one state sought at least some waivers. Conservative groups
have won enactment of legislation in several states prohibiting such waivers and
have persuaded several additional governors to forbid their human services agencies
from requesting them. Notably, despite the prowork rhetoric of ALEC, FGA, and
SIG, none has made any discernible effort to press states to offer work slots to all
recipients facing termination under the time limit despite the additional federal
E&T funding available to states that do so.59
56 Joseph Willey et al., Food & Nutrition Service, USDA, The Extent of Trafficking
in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: 2012–2014, at 12 (2017).
57 Here the business interests that fund much right-wing state-level advocacy might be playing a
role: companies selling ﬁnger-printing services in the private market can boast of larger
“libraries” if they have collected the ﬁngerprints of millions of SNAP recipients.
58 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(n)(3) (2018). Here broader Republican political priorities may play a role.
A recurrent objection to state laws requiring voters to present photographic identiﬁcation at the
polls is that many low-income voters lack such identiﬁcation; this argument can be blunted if
the state issues identity cards to many low-income people through SNAP.
59 7 U.S.C. § 2025(h)(1) (2016).
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Although these policies could be mistaken for a reemergence of the model that
sees the states as disciplinarians of the poor, they differ in both purpose and content.
Agricultural employers wanted a large workforce that would depress wages. They
thus saw an advantage in having meager programs to allow low-skilled workers to
remain in the area when not needed on the farms. Current ideologues make no
such distinctions, supporting any policy reducing beneﬁts or stigmatizing recipients
that seems to have potential political appeal. Indeed, ALEC’s and FGA’s top priority
has been denying SNAP speciﬁcally to people in areas of high unemployment by
blocking time-limit waivers there.
The new ideological approach to state SNAP policy is better understood as part of
the same agenda of distraction and diversion that has produced ﬁercely antiimmi-
grant policies, a budding trade war, and frightening rhetoric about nonexistent
crime waves. Condemning low-income people as morally unworthy may be the
only viable strategy for deﬂecting criticism of fast-rising income inequality. Politiciz-
ing SNAP also provides Tocquevillian opportunities to develop right-wing civic
virtues by practicing advocacy against antipoverty programs at the state and local
level, making participants more reliable supporters of similar national efforts.
the way forward
For the foreseeable future, the tension between fund maximization and right-wing
opposition to antipoverty programs is likely to shape states’ roles in SNAP. However
incoherent conservative proposals may be, attacks on antipoverty programs have
proven political power, and the vast quantities of right-wing funds seeking activism
to support will ensure that these positions will keep coming back.
On the other side, the forces that inclined states to seek to maximize SNAP federal
funding – ﬁrst and foremost for themselves, but also for low-income households –
have weakened signiﬁcantly in recent years. The generation of senior state adminis-
trators that remembers SNAP’s early days, and that responded at least to the afterglow
of theWar on Poverty, have now left the scene.Many were pushed out prematurely in
the conﬂict over error rates and were hence discredited with their successors. Those
that survived the QC wars largely accepted the retirement incentives states offered to
shrink their workforces during the Great Recession. In place of these administrators is
a far more technocratic generation hired to reduce error rates and implement
automated eligibility determination systems. Some are professional managers with
little or no background in social work or experience working with low-income people.
State human services agencies have changed even more dramatically on their
lower levels. Although social work–trained eligibility workers disappeared in most
states long ago, eligibility workers at least had routine contact with SNAP recipients.
Many, although by no means all, developed genuine empathy from these contacts.
That model, however, is fast disappearing. The Great Recession simultaneously
devastated state budgets, forcing large reductions in human services agencies’ staffs
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and dramatically increased the number of households seeking SNAP. The trad-
itional model assumed individual eligibility workers would serve caseloads of up to
two hundred households; in numerous states, eligibility workers’ caseloads far
exceeded one thousand. The clear political infeasibility of securing the necessary
resources from governors and legislatures caused human services administrators to
go all-in on technology. Eligibility workers were herded into gigantic call centers
where they would receive and process households’ reports of changed circum-
stances, interview applicants and recipients over the phone, examine veriﬁcation
documents scanned in at kiosks in local communities – and rarely speak with the
same household twice. Where politics precluded closing local human services
ofﬁces, states established “statewide caseloads” that enabled eligibility workers to
make changes in the beneﬁts of a household living on the other end of the state.
Eliminating continuing relationships between individual workers and recipient
households inevitably reduces empathetic voices within state agencies. Indeed,
right-wing groups continue to advocate for moving large parts of SNAP adminis-
tration out of state agencies altogether, even though the Bush administration’s two
major attempts to privatize both ended in disaster.60
State government organizations that historically served a moderating function also
are badly weakened. ALEC has pressed legislators to support it in preference to the
bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures, eroding the latter’s funding
and undercutting its claims to speak for state legislatures broadly. SIG has sought to
weaken the American Public Human Services Association (APHSA) similarly. Hard-
line Republicans have blocked the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), APHSA, and the National Governors Association from taking positions
on numerous current public beneﬁts issues important to states. Although the
resulting dysfunction is most obvious in federal policy debates, it also has weakened
policy coordination among states.
Rising inequality has fractured market after market, with some providers serving
middle- and upper-income communities and others operating in low-income areas.
Thus, many large businesses with broad political inﬂuence no longer receive
signiﬁcant business from low-income people. Trade associations of landlords, food
stores, child care providers, and the like therefore may see the recipients of public
beneﬁts as outside their customer bases.61
Nonetheless, maximizing federal funds remains the dominant theme for most
states. This can be seen in the opposition of many states to President Trump’s
proposals to require a state match for SNAP beneﬁt costs and in states’ general
disinterest in House Republicans’ various proposals to cap or block-grant SNAP
spending. Of course, in a prior era one might imagine a bipartisan outcry from states
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over the administrative burdens of redetermining households’ eligibility monthly
and having to provide work programs for millions of people, as the House of
Representatives’ 2018 farm bill would require.62
Ironically, QC now constrains states’ shift to ideological SNAP policy making.
Right-wing governors are deterred from hiring conservative zealots lacking govern-
mental experience by the danger that mismanagement will result in costly and
embarrassing ﬁscal sanctions. Ideologically motivated privatization plans in Texas
and Indiana, and aggressively harsh administration in Wisconsin, all resulted in
ballooning error rates and ﬁscal sanctions. In many states, governors and legislatures
may make ideological high-level SNAP policy decisions while technocratic SNAP
directors continue pursuing fund maximization on lower-proﬁle matters. This does
mean, however, that creating state options to moderate harsh policies will have
decreasing value as a compromise in federal policy making.
One recent episode illustrates both the continued draw of the fund-maximizing
approach and the durability of the relationship between federal and state SNAP
administrators. The USDA Inspector General attacked some states for manipulating
sampling procedures to reduce their error rates.63 The prospect of reigniting the
QC wars was sufﬁciently repellent to all concerned that FNS and state administrators
worked cooperatively in revising procedures to address these concerns. Whether
similar cooperation remains possible on higher-proﬁle issues is very much in doubt.
The demise of the disciplinarian model and the weakening of the fund maximiza-
tion model of state SNAP are the result of shifts in the power of various interest groups
and in the extent of their attention to SNAP. Further shifts are inevitable. If ongoing
changes in the economics of food retailing cause large, powerful corporations to see
low-income people as part of their consumer bases, the fund maximization model
may revive. If President Trump moves the country sharply to the right, progressives
may become even more distracted defending other laws and programs and leave
SNAP policy increasingly to right-wing ideologues. If, by contrast, the country swings
left in reaction to President Trump and Congress enacts a single-payor health
insurance plan, perhaps hunger will become a major new priority for progressives
and they may come to dominate state SNAP policy making. Other groups that have
not traditionally been active in state SNAP policy making could well emerge.
The long-standing assumption that states played little meaningful role in make
SNAP policy was never true. With the range of groups that have sought to shape
state SNAP policies over the past several decades, states’ roles are now gaining much
wider recognition. We can and should judge the political and moral climate of a
state by how it treats those struggling to secure enough food.
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